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Supreme Guidance for Wet Growth:  
Lessons from the High Court on the Powers 
and Responsibilities of Local Governments 
Michael Allan Wolf1 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  MOVING WET GROWTH FROM  
IDEA TO IMPLEMENTATION 
When Chapman University School of Law last assembled a 
set of nationally recognized experts to discuss the idea of manag-
ing growth through water law, the convener, Professor Tony Ar-
nold, did a masterful job of summing up the “Wet Growth” 
movement.2  He noted, 
There is a need for a concept of “wet growth”: integration of concerns 
about water quality and the availability of water supply into the den-
sity, form, pattern, and location of land development. This “wet 
growth idea”—that growth and land use should be sustainable with 
respect to aquatic ecosystems and water resources—may simply be an 
aspect of a broad smart growth agenda (or an even broader sustain-
ability agenda) or may carve out its own identity as a planning and 
regulatory concept.3 
While several commentators (academics and practitioners 
alike) have endorsed this merger of water law and planning, and 
although there has been some experimentation on (and below) 
the ground, we have not yet seen widespread adoption of integra-
tive controls on the local and state level.  In other words, there 
has not yet been an extensive shift from the idea stage to the im-
plementation stage. 
Before such a shift can occur, local and state regulators need 
 
 1 Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, Levin College of Law, Univer-
sity of Florida.  The author thanks two outstanding University of Florida law students—
Leslie Utiger and Steven Wernick—for their first-rate research assistance.  This article 
was prepared for, and presented as part of, the well-organized and provocative Chapman 
Law Review Symposium on “The Slippery Slope: Urban Runoff, Water Quality, and the 
Issue of Legal Authority,” January 27, 2006, Chapman University School of Law. 
 2 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Is Wet Growth Smarter Than Smart Growth?:  The 
Fragmentation and Integration of Land Use and Water, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10152 (2005); 
see also WET GROWTH:  SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE (Craig Anthony (Tony) 
Arnold ed. 2005) (including chapters written by participants at a conference at Chapman 
University School of Law in February, 2003) [hereinafter WET GROWTH]. 
 3 Arnold, supra note 2, at 10154. 
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strong guidance from experts in the field, not only in extra-legal 
fields such as planning, hydrology, geology, engineering, biology, 
and transportation, but also in mainstream legal areas including 
legislation (local, state, and federal), administrative law, and en-
forcement.  The purpose of this article is to identify a somewhat 
unorthodox source of guidance—the United States Supreme 
Court, specifically the Rehnquist Court from October, 1984, 
through June, 2005, a period of remarkable stability for the na-
tion’s highest tribunal.  From the October 1994 Term, when As-
sociate Justice Stephen Breyer joined the Court, through the Oc-
tober 2004 Term, after which Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
died, the membership of the Court did not change, making it the 
longest-serving group of nine Justices in the history of the 
Court.4 
Part II of this article presents a hypothetical local jurisdic-
tion—appropriately named Hydro City—which is experimenting 
with various wet growth controls.  The purpose of the controls is 
to regulate land development to minimize harm to precious water 
resources in and around the community.  Part III shifts the locus 
of the article from the mythical community to the very real Su-
preme Court building in the nation’s capital, in which nine Jus-
tices sit, deliberate, and formulate opinions on a wide range of 
important topics.  This section of the article asks the reader to 
conceive of the modern Supreme Court not as a “court of the last 
resort,” but as a body of legal commentators. 
The powers and responsibilities of local governments com-
prised one of the significant areas addressed by the legal com-
mentators comprising the Rehnquist Court from the eleven terms 
during which there was no change in Court membership, as dem-
onstrated in Part IV.  This article refers to several Supreme 
Court cases involving local governments, decided during those se-
lected Terms, which contain lessons from the commentators per-
tinent to the application of wet growth controls.  The facts, out-
comes, and rationales of fourteen, highly relevant cases are 
reviewed, along with the specific lessons they provide. 
Part V returns the reader to Hydro City and includes four 
examples that illustrate how the Court’s lessons can afford guid-
ance to wet growth regulators, to landowners and developers, 
 
 4 See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Nine Justices, Ten Years:  A Statistical Ret-
rospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510, 510 n.1 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 2003 Term 
marked an unprecedented milestone for the Supreme Court: for the first time in history, 
nine Justices celebrated a full decade presiding together over the nation’s highest court,” 
and that “[a] seven-Justice Court sat together for more than a decade only once, from Jus-
tice Joseph Story’s appointment in 1812 to Justice Brockholst Livingston’s death in 
1823.). 
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and to the public and private sector attorneys who represent 
their interests.  The article concludes with observations concern-
ing the potential usefulness of the Rehnquist Court’s lessons in 
furthering the goals of advocates of wet growth controls. 
II.  WET GROWTH CONTROLS IN HYDRO CITY 
The imaginary municipality of Hydro City is the county seat 
of Orange County, located on the coast of Califlorida.  Hydro 
City’s population stands at one million, and the city is experienc-
ing extreme pressures to grow even more rapidly.  The city is lo-
cated in one of most attractive regions in one of the nation’s most 
populous states, a state that features a long coastal border, many 
freshwater lakes, and a temperate climate.  The Tributaria River 
flows through the center of Hydro City and empties into the 
ocean only twenty miles away. 
Concerned about the negative externalities attending unbri-
dled real estate development—including, but certainly not lim-
ited to, nonpoint source pollution of sensitive surface water bod-
ies and groundwater, the destruction of functional wetlands, and 
the destruction of critical habitat for endangered and threatened 
species—the Hydro City Council, after two years of study and 
consultation with scientific, engineering, legal and planning ex-
perts, followed by extensive public hearings, announced a pack-
age of proposed new regulations and enforcement strategies. 
• Hydro City’s proposed “wet growth package” consists 
of the following ten tools: 
• Development moratoria;5 
• Riparian buffer zones;6 
• Prohibition of certain uses in lands bordering water 
bodies;7 
• Density limitations in watersheds;8 
• Aquifer recharge overlay zones prohibiting some uses 
 
 5 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10156 (noting that “growth moratoria imposed be-
cause of water concerns have fared much better” than “[t]he use of moratoria on new wa-
ter supplies in order to control or stop growth”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (upholding set of development mora-
toria in face of regulatory takings challenge). 
 6 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10173 (“it is also becoming common for local or state 
governments to adopt riparian or shoreline buffer zones that restrict development within 
a certain distance of river banks, stream banks, and lake shores.”); see also Alan W. Flen-
ner, Municipal Riparian Buffer Regulations in Pennsylvania—Confronting the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 207 (1998) (discussing riparian buffer 
regulations in Kennett Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania). 
 7 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10156–57. 
 8 See id. 
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and requiring special use permits or the use of best 
management practices (BMPs) for other uses;9 
• Aggressive enforcement of existing regulations 
against certain developers;10 
• Variable water pricing, increasing cost as usage 
rises;11 
• Performance zoning standards;12 
• Incentive and bonus zoning;13 and 
• Conditional grants of building permits.14 
In many ways, city officials have cherry-picked some of the 
wet growth controls that show the greatest potential for success 
in restricting development that poses the greatest harms to sen-
sitive water bodies and in encouraging positive steps by those 
who choose to make more intensive use of land. 
Not surprisingly, given the litigious climate that has long 
typified the American ethos, landowners and developers in the 
region who are skeptical about most, if not all of these proposed 
regulations, have already lined up some skillful legal talent to 
investigate the possibility of a frontal attack on any new tools 
that the local government chooses to employ.  Indeed, several le-
gal activists who champion private property rights have offered 
their services in the national struggle against regulations these 
true believers deem to be confiscatory, arbitrary, and retribu-
tive.15 
Rather than wait for the inevitable facial or as-applied chal-
lenge to their wet growth tools, counsel for the city should—
before the local legislature votes on any ordinances and before lo-
cal regulators implement new enforcement policies, incentives, or 
conditional permitting—conduct research into the legality, feasi-
bility, and advisability of the proposed package. 
 
 9 See id. at 10157 (describing the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone in San Antonio, 
Texas). 
 10 See id. at 10157–58 (citing actions taken by the Santa Ana Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board against a well-known developer in Orange County, California). 
 11 See id. at 10159 (quoting Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Management and Land 
Use Planning: Is It Time for Closer Coordination?, in WET GROWTH, supra note 2, at 103). 
 12 See Arnold, supra note 2, at 10173. 
 13 See id. at 10174. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See, e.g., Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of 
Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2163 n.14 (2002) (“The ‘property 
rights movement’ has been active in promoting takings legislation and in supporting court 
challenges to allegedly confiscatory land-use and environmental regulations . . . .”); see 
also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and 
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 511 (1998). 
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Most of research sources consulted by the local government 
attorneys will be routine:  ordinances from other Califlorida 
communities, state and federal decisional law, and the commen-
tary written by experts from law, environmental science, and re-
lated fields.  As the next part of this article explains, today there 
is one additional source of guidance available to Hydro City’s 
counsel and to the living and breathing local government attor-
neys who are actually advising real municipalities—the legal 
commentary of the Rehnquist Court. 
III.  CONCEIVING OF THE HIGH COURT AS A BODY OF LEGAL 
COMMENTATORS 
Very earlier in the tribunal’s history, when the Justices still 
“rode circuit,” members of the United States Supreme Court were 
fairly accurately viewed as a court of last resort.16  In fact, a 
variation on that phrase was employed by the Justices in their 
respectful, but resistant, response to President George Washing-
ton’s request (forwarded by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
on July 18, 1793) for the judges’ advice regarding important is-
sues facing the new nation struggling to maintain its neutrality 
as war consumed Europe: 
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces 
frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions 
arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace 
of the United States. These questions depend for their solution on the 
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on 
the laws of the land, and are often presented under circumstances 
which do not give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the coun-
try.17 
Chief Justice John Jay and his colleagues responded: 
We have considered the previous question stated in a letter written by 
your direction to us by the Secretary of State on the 18th of last month 
[regarding] the lines of separation drawn by our Constitution between 
the three departments of the government.  These being in certain re-
spects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the 
last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against 
the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to, 
 
 16 See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 58 
(rev. ed. 1926) (“By the provisions of [the Judiciary Act], the country had been divided into 
three Circuits (the Eastern, Middle, and Southern), to each of which two Supreme Court 
Judges were permanently assigned and directed to hold Court twice a year in each Dis-
trict, in company with the District Judges.”). 
 17 LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JOHN JAY, JULY 18, 1793, reprinted in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 257 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press 1987); see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911) 
(quoting 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486 (Henry P. Johns-
ton ed., 1970). 
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especially as the power [given] by the Constitution to the President, of 
calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been 
purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.18 
By the third decade of the twentieth century, however, with the 
development of certiorari review and a restructuring of the fed-
eral judiciary,19 the High Court’s role had begun to shift signifi-
cantly. 
Today, district courts and courts of appeal resolve the over-
whelming majority of disputes in the federal system.20  As the 
number of cases decided by lower federal courts skyrocketed in 
the closing years of the last century, the Supreme Court signifi-
cantly reduced its caseload.21  For example, in 1965, the Warren 
Court Justices granted certiorari review in twelve percent of the 
cases not filed in forma pauperis (124 cases  were granted review 
out of 1,164 cases on the docket).22  Ten years later, the number 
of such cases on the docket of the Burger Court climbed to 2,352, 
while the number of cases reviewed nearly doubled to 244 (ten 
 
 18 LETTER FROM JOHN JAY TO GEORGE WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 8, 1793, reprinted in 
4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 258 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., The 
University of Chicago Press 1987) (emphasis added); see also Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 354 
(quoting 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486 (Henry P. Johns-
ton ed., 1970). 
 19 See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, 
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267 (2001).  
Professor Post observed: 
  The [Judiciary Act of February 13, 1925] represented a fundamental trans-
formation of the role of the Supreme Court. Before the Act, the Court was pri-
marily a tribunal of ultimate resort; it was the highest and the last source of 
appellate review, whose chief function was correctly to discern and to protect 
the federal rights of litigants.  But the Act’s sharp constriction of the Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction “completely overrode” this “obstinate concep-
tion that the Court was to be the vindicator of all federal rights.”  And the Act’s 
extraordinary enlargement of the Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction 
expressed a profound recharacterization of the Court’s function. 
Id. at 1272–73 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 260–61 (1928)); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Question-
ing Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1643 (2000). 
 20 For statistical analysis, see CAROL KRAFKA ET. AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STALKING 
THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS (1995), available at http://www. 
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rate_of_appeal.pdf/$File/rate_of_appeal.pdf; see also Leonidas 
Ralph Mecham, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures (Mar. 2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljfftables.pdf. 
 21 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 403, 403–04.  Professor Hellman observed: 
In the 1970s, when the Supreme Court was giving plenary consideration to 150 
cases a Term, the courts of appeals were deciding about 10,000 cases on the 
merits annually. Today the number of merits decisions by the courts of appeals 
exceeds 25,000 each year. 
Id. at 404. 
 22 LEE EPSTEIN ET. AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 69 (3d ed. 2003). 
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percent).23  Only twenty years later, the Rehnquist Court granted 
review in ninety-two of such cases, only four percent of the 2,456 
filed.24  The numbers of reviews granted in in forma pauperis 
cases showed a similar pattern:  Although 1,610 of such cases 
were filed in 1965, 2,395 in 1975, and 5,098 in 1995, the percent-
age of cases granted certiorari review fell from three percent in 
1965 (forty-three cases), to one percent in 1975 (twenty-eight 
cases), and three-tenths of a percent in 1995 (thirteen cases).25 
During the first Term that William H. Rehnquist served as 
Chief Justice, the Court issued opinions in 159 cases,26 a number 
 
 23 Id. at 70. 
 24 Id. at 71. 
 25 Id. at 69–71. 
 26 The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 304 (1986).  
The figures in this paragraph derive from the Harvard Law Review’s annual statistical 
review of the work of the Supreme Court over the previous Term (“The Statistics.”).  Here 
is a summary of the annual number of cases in which the Supreme Court issued opinions 
for the last twenty-six, full Terms: 
1979 Term (Berger, C.J.)—149 
1980 Term—138 
1981 Term—167 
1982 Term—162 
1983 Term—163 
1984 Term—151 
1985 Term (Rehnquist, C.J.)—159 
1986 Term—152 
1987 Term—142 
1988 Term—143 
1989 Term—139 
1990 Term—120 
1991 Term—116 
1992 Term—114 
1993 Term—87 
1994 Term—86 
1995 Term—79 
1996 Term—86 
1997 Term—93 
1998 Term—81 
1999 Term—77 
2000 Term—86 
2001 Term—81 
2002 Term—78 
2003 Term—83 
2004 Term—79. 
The above figures derive from the corresponding Harvard Law Review Leading Cases- 
Statistics summary printed annually: 
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term- The Statistics, 94 HARV. L. REV. 289, 289 (1980); The 
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in line with that of several of the preceding terms.  By the 1990 
Term, the total number of opinions issued decreased to 120 
(down nineteen from the previous year), and then dropped to 116 
(1991 Term) and 114 (1992 Term).27  For the twelve remaining 
Rehnquist Court Terms, the totals ranged from a high of ninety-
three cases (1997 Term) to a low of seventy-seven cases (1999 
Term).28  Given these reduced numbers, it might be hard for 
some to realize that, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was ac-
tive debate over various proposals to reduce the Supreme Court’s 
heavy workload, such as the “‘creation of a National Court of Ap-
peals which would screen all petitions for review now filed in the 
Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many cases of 
conflicts between the circuits.’”29 
The reduced number of cases resulting in fewer Court opin-
 
Supreme Court, 1980 Term- The Statistics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 339, 339 (1981); The Su-
preme Court, 1981 Term- The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304 (1982); The Supreme 
Court, 1982 Term- The Statistics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 295, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 
1983 Term- The Statistics, 98 HARV. L. REV. 307, 307 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1984 
Term- The Statistics, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 (1985); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term- 
The Statistics, 100 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term- The 
Statistics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 362 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term- The Statis-
tics, 102 HARV. L. REV. 350, 350 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term- The Statistics, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 394, 394 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term- The Statistics, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 359, 359 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term- The Statistics, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 419, 419 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term- The Statistics, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 378, 378 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term- The Statistics, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
372, 372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term- The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 
372 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term- The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 340 
(1995); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term- The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1996); 
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term- The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 431 (1997); The 
Supreme Court, 1997 Term- The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 366 (1998); The Su-
preme Court, 1998 Term- The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV.  400, 400 (1999); The Supreme 
Court, 1999 Term- The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 (2000); The Supreme Court, 
2000 Term- The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 539 (2001); The Supreme Court, 2001 
Term- The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 (2002); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term- 
The Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 480 (2003); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term- The 
Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 497 (2004); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term- The Statis-
tics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 420, 420 (2005). 
 27 See table supra note 26. 
 28 See table supra note 26. 
 29 Note, Of High Designs:  A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the 
Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307, 310 (1982) (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF 
THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1972), reprinted in 57 
F.R.D. 573, 581 (1972)) [hereinafter High Designs].  There were other proposals designed 
to tackle the time needed to review adequately the growing number of certiorari petitions.  
Justice John Paul Stevens promoted two such fixes. Justice Stevens first “called for [the] 
establishment of a new court having the sole task of screening certiorari petitions and se-
lecting the docket of the Supreme Court.” High Designs, supra note 29, at 311 (citing John 
Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182 (1982)).  
Justice Stevens also proposed to “redefine the review of certiorari petitions to require ma-
jority approval for the grant of a writ,” replacing the “rule of four” with “a rule of five.”  Id. 
at 318 (citing J. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule (Oct. 27, 1982) (James 
Madison Lecture delivered at the New York University School of Law) (available on re-
quest from the Public Information Office, U.S. Supreme Court)). 
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ions, and the stable membership of the Court, though noteworthy 
developments on their own,30 in combination have afforded a 
unique opportunity to view the institution of the Supreme Court 
in a new way.  These same nine jurists have begun to focus their 
attention on a relatively small number of issues, for example, by 
choosing not to accept every question upon which the circuits 
have split.  While the Court is subject to criticism for allowing too 
many important questions to remain unresolved on a national 
scale,31 the Justices, perhaps, though not necessarily, by design,32 
 
 30 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003) (“The second Rehnquist Court 
started in October 1994 and is still with us. This Court has had no change in its member-
ship, has decided just half the number of cases the Court did in 1986, and is increasingly 
dominated by a single bloc of five Justices.”).  Professor Merrill also noted that “the first 
Rehnquist Court experienced extensive and frequent changes in membership, while the 
second Rehnquist Court has experienced no change in membership—it has functioned 
with the same cast of characters now for over eight uninterrupted years.”  Id. at 638.  See 
also Hellman, supra note 21, at 403. 
 31 See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, A Step In the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit 
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. 
REV. 605, 610 (2003): 
The time has come for Congress and the courts to take action to reduce con-
flicts among the federal appellate courts regarding federal law. The current 
system is bursting at the seams as the federal appellate courts and the Su-
preme Court receive appeals and petitions for writs of certiorari in record 
numbers. 
See also Split Circuits: A Blog Dedicated to Tracking Developments Concerning Splits 
Among the Federal Circuit Courts, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2006). 
 32 Professor Merrill has offered this informed speculation: 
  There is no evidence . . . that William Rehnquist assumed the office of 
Chief Justice with any intention to cut back on the number of cases heard by 
the Court. As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was a frequent filer of dissents 
from denial of certiorari, implicitly advocating that more, rather than fewer, 
cases be heard. On the eve of his appointment, he published an article bemoan-
ing the inability of the Court to decide more cases and urging the creation of 
the National Court of Appeals to take up the slack.  Moreover, at his confirma-
tion hearings in 1986, he told the Senate “I think the 150 cases [per year] that 
we have turned out quite regularly over a period of 10 or 15 years is just about 
where we should be at.” 
  In contrast, we know from published reports that Justice Scalia, from his 
early years on the Court, strongly favored reducing the number of cases heard 
by the Court in order to allow more time for each case and improve the quality 
of the Court’s deliberations. 
  . . . 
  I am not inclined to attribute any deep strategic significance to what I 
have surmised to be Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a smaller case load. The de-
cline has little to do with the politically-significant cases, which are too few in 
number to explain the shrinkage of the docket we have witnessed. What has 
happened is that the number of more routine cases involving statutory inter-
pretation and civil and criminal procedural rights issues has been cut roughly 
in half.  If pressed to explain Justice Scalia’s motivation for wanting to get rid 
of half of the lower-profile cases, I would suggest that it may have something to 
do with the fact that he is heavily involved in drafting and revising the opin-
ions that issue under his name. The prospect of doing this against a base of 150 
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have offered important commentary on a number of significant 
legal issues.  These issues include, but are certainly not limited 
to:  the position and legal status of states in a federal system;33 
the importance of original intent;34 the tension between textual-
ism and a more organic view of the words of the Constitution;35 
the balance between, and separation of, governmental powers;36 
the most effective methods of statutory interpretation;37 the ap-
propriateness of relying on legislative history;38 the relevance of 
foreign sources of law;39 the role and status of administrative 
agencies;40 and the powers and responsibilities of local govern-
 
decisions a year is far more exhausting than doing so against a base of 80 deci-
sions a year. Other Justices who joined the Court during the first Rehnquist 
years, including Justices Souter and Breyer, are also heavily involved in the 
opinion-production process. So they too might welcome relief from having to 
produce their share of an extra seventy opinions, most of which involve rather 
routine and unexciting issues. 
Merrill, supra note 30, at 643–44 (footnotes omitted). 
 33 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (“‘The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.’”). 
 34 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“The Copyright Clause and 
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Fram-
ers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. In-
deed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 n.7 (2000) (“That is virtuoso 
lexicography, but it shows only that English is rich enough to give even textualists room 
for creative readings.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004) (“[T]he position that the 
courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the le-
gality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of 
separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch 
of government.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (“Common sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons 
of statutory construction.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280–
81(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omit-
ted): 
  Our opinions using legislative history are often curiously casual, some-
times even careless, in their analysis of what “intent” the legislative history 
shows. Perhaps that is because legislative history is in any event a make-
weight; the Court really makes up its mind on the basis of other factors. Or 
perhaps it is simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical attitude, when 
the point of departure for the inquiry is the fairyland in which legislative his-
tory reflects what was in “the Congress’s mind.” 
 39 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (“I disagree with Justice Scalia’s contention that foreign and interna-
tional law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the course of 
nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law 
as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency.”). 
 40 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted) 
(“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been un-
derstood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s 
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the 
agency’s position.”). 
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ments.41 
From the October 1994 Term through the October 2004 
Term, the Justices wrote opinions in nearly seventy cases that 
directly addressed the powers and responsibilities of local gov-
ernments.42  While the great majority of those cases have rela-
tively minimal relevance to the various wet-growth tools re-
viewed in Part II of this article, there are several cases that 
deserve closer attention for the instructive lessons they contain. 
IV.  GLEANING LESSONS FROM THE COMMENTATORS 
During the eleven Terms in which the membership of the 
United States Supreme Court remained stable, this body of legal 
commentators issued opinions in fourteen cases that provide im-
portant guidance for local governments seeking to implement or 
enforce wet-growth tools.  While only half of these cases actually 
concerned land-use planning,43 and only a couple addressed wet-
growth controls,44 the lessons they convey apply to situations far 
beyond, though analogous to, the facts of each dispute. 
Lesson #1:  The Court Looks at Actual Intent and Does Not 
Accept Sham Purposes 
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,45 two Kentucky 
counties made multiple attempts to post the same version of the 
Ten Commandments in their courthouses—first as a free-
standing display; then, after the American Civil Liberties Union 
brought suit claiming a violation of the Establishment Clause, 
surrounded by other religion-related historical texts; and finally, 
after switching legal counsel, “by eliminating some documents, 
expanding the text set out in another, and adding some new 
ones.”46  The five-member majority in McCreary County found 
that the counties had violated the first prong of the familiar, but 
 
 41 See infra notes 32–154 and accompanying text; see Cook County v. United States, 
538 U.S. 119, 133–34 (2003) (wherein the Court declares that local governments may be 
held liable for filing false claims in order to obtain federal funds). 
 42 For a list of these cases, see http://lic.law.ufl.edu/~wolfm/localgovt.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2006). 
 43 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye 
Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000); City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 44 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 45 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005). 
 46 Id. 
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not universally popular, test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman:47 
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”48  The McCreary 
County Court found “as seismic as they are unconvincing,” the 
counties’ assertions that “true ‘purpose’ is unknowable, and its 
search merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpre-
dictably in picking out evidence of subjective intent.”49 
Given the shifting tactics employed by county officials to 
secularize their religious intent, it is no surprise that their coun-
sel sought to discredit the notion that courts can discern purpose.  
In essence, the majority suspected that the local governments 
were being much less than genuine, noting that: 
the Court often does accept governmental statements of purpose, in 
keeping with the respect owed in the first instance to such official 
claims.  But in those unusual cases where the claim was an apparent 
sham, or the secular purpose secondary, the unsurprising results have 
been findings of no adequate secular object, as against a predomi-
nantly religious one.50 
In other words, there is a limit of judicial toleration for govern-
ment officials who employ pretense in their attempts to avoid 
constitutional restraints. 
Lesson #2:  The Court Is Skeptical About Claims to 
Property That Are Unsubstantiated by State Law 
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,51 a seven-member major-
ity rejected a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,52 alleging 
that “an individual who has obtained a state-law restraining or-
der has a constitutionally protected property interest in having 
the police enforce the restraining order when they have probable 
cause to believe it has been violated.”53  The plaintiff, a mother of 
three children murdered by her husband, claimed that the town 
violated her Due Process rights “because its police department 
had ‘an official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to 
complaints of restraining order violations’ and ‘tolerated the non-
enforcement of restraining orders by its police officers.’”54 
 
 47 Id. at 2735, 2745; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 48 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 49 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2734. 
 50 Id. at 2736 (emphasis added). 
 51 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 52 Id. at 2800, 2802. 
 53 Id. at 2800. 
 54 Id. at 2802 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a). 
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Reversing an en banc Tenth Circuit opinion recognizing a 
procedural due process claim by the plaintiff,55 the Court in-
structed: 
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect 
everything that might be described as a “benefit”: “To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need or desire” and “more than a unilateral expectation of it.  
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”  Board 
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  Such 
entitlements are “‘of course, . . . not created by the Constitution.  
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such 
as state law.’”56 
Furthermore, the majority explained that “a benefit is not a pro-
tected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in 
their discretion.”57  By narrowing the conception of entitlements 
the Court in turn reduces the chances that a successful proce-
dural due process claim can be brought against government offi-
cials. 
Lesson #3:  Comprehensive Planning Earns Deference and 
Trumps Private Rights-Based Arguments 
In one of the Rehnquist Court’s most controversial cases,58 
Kelo v. City of New London,59 five Justices upheld the use of emi-
nent domain by the New London Development Corporation in 
furtherance of an ambitious economic revitalization plan for 
ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of the economically dis-
tressed Connecticut city.60  The majority, affirming the holding of 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut and following two key prece-
dents—Berman v. Parker,61 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff62—concluded that the real property of the plaintiffs was 
taken “for public use.”63  Noting that the “‘Court long ago rejected 
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use 
 
 55 Id. at 2802, 2811. 
 56 Id. at 2803 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (quoting in turn Roth, 408 U.S. at 
577)). 
 57 Id. at 2803. 
 58 See generally John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1 (discussing the reaction to the decision rendered in Kelo v. 
City of New London). 
 59 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 60 Id. at 2658–59. 
 61 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (allowing the use of eminent domain as part of a redevelopment 
project for a blighted neighborhood). 
 62 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (allowing the use of condemnation to transfer fee interests 
from landlords to tenants in order to combat the evils of “land oligopoly”). 
 63 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658, 2660–61, 2669. 
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for the general public,’”64 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for 
the majority, explained that the case “turns on the question 
whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’  
Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, 
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments in this field.”65 
In fact, the city’s development plan was the focus of the ma-
jority’s discussion in several key parts of the opinion,66 particu-
larly the following passage: 
Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to re-
move blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that 
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic 
rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully for-
mulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide 
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means 
limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exer-
cises in urban planning and development,  the City is endeavoring to 
coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses 
of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the 
sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state 
statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to pro-
mote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of 
the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the 
limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Ber-
man, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a 
piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that 
plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged 
here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.67 
The result was deference to state and local officials who engage 
in comprehensive planning efforts, despite serious claims of pri-
vate property rights violations.68 
 
 64 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244). 
 65 Id. at 2663 (emphasis added). 
 66 See, e.g., id. at 2658 (“the city of New London approved a development plan”), id. 
at 2659 (“the NLDC finalized an integrated development plan, “ “[t]he development plan 
encompasses seven parcels,” “NLDC intended the development plan to capitalize on the 
arrival of the Pfizer facility,” “the plan was also designed to make the City more attractive 
and to create leisure and recreational opportunities”), id. at 2661 (“The takings before us, 
however, would be executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan”), and 
id. at 2667 (“Such a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an 
integrated development plan, is not presented in this case.”). 
 67 Id. at 2664–65 (footnote omitted). 
 68 See, e.g., id. at 2684–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is backwards to adopt a 
searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as 
welfare benefits . . . while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to what consti-
tutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent domain, and thereby invades 
individuals’ traditional rights in real property.”). 
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Lesson #4:  Ripeness Requirements Continue to Be 
Significant Hurdles for Those Bringing Regulatory 
Takings Challenges 
Although in theory regulations that go “too far” amount to 
unconstitutional takings, 69 in practice it remains a difficult task 
for a property owner to receive just compensation or other relief 
for allegedly confiscatory land regulations.  That task was made 
even more arduous by the Supreme Court in 2005, when it issued 
its holding in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San 
Francisco.70  The City Planning Commission assessed a $567,000 
“conversion fee” against the hotel for changing residential hotel 
units into tourist units, and the result was a set of lawsuits 
brought by the hotel owners:  the first suit was a mandamus ac-
tion in state court, followed a month later by a federal case alleg-
ing (among other claims) a regulatory taking.71 
The federal district court granted summary judgment in the 
government’s favor; in the Ninth Circuit, the hotel owners re-
quested that the federal court abstain and not hear their federal 
claims, so the parties returned to state court.72  However, the ho-
tel owners made a fatal tactical error.  Instead of reserving their 
takings claims, as instructed by the court of appeals, the owners 
actually raised claims before the federal district court that closely 
resembled those they were supposed to have reserved.73  Ulti-
mately, the California Supreme Court, applying a “reasonable re-
lationship” test, denied the facial and as-applied challenges to 
the city’s Hotel Conversion Ordinance (HCO).74  When the hotel 
owners returned to federal court, they did not get a warm recep-
tion, as the district court and court of appeals found that the 
owners’ takings claims had been precluded.75 
The specific issue before the United States Supreme Court 
was “whether federal courts may craft an exception to the full 
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, for claims brought un-
der the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”76  Complicating 
the matter was the fact that the hotel owners were required to go 
to state court in accordance with the Court’s decision in William-
 
 69 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule 
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
 70 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
 71 Id. at 2496–97. 
 72 Id. at 2497. 
 73 Id. at 2499–2500. 
 74 Id. at 2500. 
 75 Id. at 2499–2500. 
 76 Id. at 2495. 
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son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,77 a 
1985 case holding “that takings claims are not ripe until a State 
fails ‘to provide adequate compensation for the taking.’”78  Never-
theless, the San Remo majority was ultimately unsympathetic 
with property owners who had failed to make wise litigation de-
cisions: 
  At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern 
that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that 
are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal tak-
ings claims.  Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not 
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the 
availability of a federal forum.  The Court of Appeals was correct to 
decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738.79 
The road to recovery for a regulatory taking would remain, for 
the foreseeable future, a long, winding, often frustrating path. 
Lesson #5:  The Text Trumps Legislative History 
Efforts by government officials to reduce air pollution in 
metropolitan Los Angeles were negated by the Supreme Court’s 
finding of federal preemption in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. District.80  In 2000, the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) was charged 
with “developing and implementing a ‘comprehensive basinwide 
air quality management plan’ to reduce emission levels and 
thereby achieve and maintain ‘state and federal ambient air 
quality standards.’”81 SCAQMD adopted six Fleet Rules (for vehi-
cles such as street sweepers, passenger vehicles, public transit 
vehicles, and others) specifying the “the types of vehicles that 
fleet operators must purchase or lease when adding or replacing 
fleet vehicles.”82  The Fleet Rules mandated the purchase or lease 
of alternative-fuel vehicles or of vehicles, such as Low-Emission 
and Zero-Emission Vehicles, among others, that “meet certain 
emission specifications established by the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB).”83 
The Engine Manufacturers responded in turn with a federal 
suit, “claiming that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted by § 209 of 
the CAA [Clean Air Act], which prohibits the adoption or at-
tempted enforcement of any state or local ‘standard relating to 
 
 77 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 78 San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195). 
 79 Id. at 2507. 
 80 541 U.S. 246, 248, 258–59 (2004). 
 81 Id. at 249 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40402(e) (West 1996)). 
 82 Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 248–49. 
 83 Id. at 250, 250 n.1, 250 n.3. 
03) 233-264 WOLF (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC 6/30/2006 12:47:12 PM 
2006] Supreme Guidance for Wet Growth 249 
the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor 
vehicle engines.’”84  The district court granted summary judg-
ment to SCAQMD,85 and the court of appeals affirmed,86 but the 
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion for eight Justices written 
by Justice Scalia.87 
The Court’s decision was directed primarily at the word 
“standard,” the key term found in § 209(a).88  Turning to one of 
his most trusty interpretive sources—”Webster’s Second”89—
Justice Scalia noted: 
Today, as in 1967 when § 209(a) became law, “standard” is defined as 
that which “is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as 
a model or example; criterion; test.”  Webster’s Second New Interna-
tional Dictionary 2455 (1945).  The criteria referred to in § 209(a) re-
late to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine.  To meet 
them the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount 
of a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution-
control device, or must have some other design feature related to the 
control of emissions.  This interpretation is consistent with the use of 
“standard” throughout Title II of the CAA (which governs emissions 
from moving sources) to denote requirements such as numerical emis-
sion levels with which vehicles or engines must comply, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7521(a)(3)(B)(ii) [42 USCS § 7521(a)(3)(B)(ii)], or emission-control 
technology with which they must be equipped, e.g., § 7521(a)(6).90 
Because it was “likely that at least certain aspects of the Fleet 
 
 84 Id. at 251 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000)). 
 85 Id. at 251. 
 86 Id. at 252. 
 87 Id. at 247. 
 88 Id. at 252–59. 
 89 For other Supreme Court opinions in which Justice Scalia relied on the second 
edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary to define terms, many of which are 
parts of everyday usage, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (“gerrymander”); 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (“origin”); 
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 264, 298 (2003) (“enact” and “until”); Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002) (“impartial”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (“public health”); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 
U.S. 320, 333–34 (2000) (“abridge”); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998) 
(“eligible” and “participate”); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United 
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America, 523 U.S. 653, 656–57 (1998) 
(“for”); Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1998) (“statement”); Allentown 
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 367, 367 n.2 (1998) 
(“doubt” and “objective”); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“subject to”); Walters 
v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207–08 (1997) (“have”); Capitol Square Review 
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (“endorsement”); Asgrow Seed Co. v. 
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“market”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227–28, 242 n.5 (1994) (“modify”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 
131 (1993) (“conviction”); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 
(1993) (“invidious”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (“unusual”); Chan v. 
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (“irregularity”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 
U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (“substantial”). 
 90 Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 252–53. 
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Rules are pre-empted” by § 209,”91 the decision of the court of ap-
peals was vacated, and the case was remanded for further pro-
ceedings.92 
In contrast, Justice David Souter, the sole dissenter, argued 
that “legislative history should inform interpretive choice, and 
the legislative history of this preemption provision shows that 
Congress’s purpose in passing it was to stop States from impos-
ing regulatory requirements that directly limited what manufac-
turers could sell.”93  Justice Souter also highlighted the difference 
between his approach to the case and the majority’s: 
  In sum, I am reading “standard” in a practical way that keeps the 
Act’s preemption of standards in tune with Congress’s object in pro-
viding for preemption, which was to prevent the States from forcing 
manufacturers to produce engines with particular characteristics as a 
legal condition of sale. The majority’s approach eliminates this consid-
eration of legislative purposes, as well as the presumption against 
preemption, by acting as though anything that could possibly be de-
scribed as a standard must necessarily be a “standard” for the pur-
poses of the Act: a standard is a standard is a standard.  The majority 
reveals its misalliance with Gertrude Stein throughout its response to 
this dissent.94 
Even though the legislative history strongly indicated that the 
Fleet Rules were consistent with congressional intent, the words 
in the text of the preemptive provision ultimately controlled. 
Lesson #6:  Judges Appreciate the Administrative 
Burdens Faced by Local Officials 
In City of Los Angeles v. David,95 a car owner “made a federal 
case out of it” when he had to wait twenty-seven days for a hear-
ing at which the city denied his claim that trees blocked his view 
of a “no parking sign.”96  In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court re-
jected Edwin David’s claim “that the city, in failing to provide a 
sufficiently prompt hearing, had violated his federal right to ‘due 
process of law,’”97 reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision “that the 
Constitution required the city to provide an earlier payment-
recovery hearing, perhaps within 48 hours of the towing and at 
least within 5 days.”98 
Central to the Supreme Court’s decision were the practical 
 
 91 Id. at 258. 
 92 Id. at 259. 
 93 Id. at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 94 Id. at 263–64 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 95 538 U.S. 715 (2003). 
 96 Id. at 716. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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difficulties faced by a large city in processing hearings of this 
kind: 
The nature of the city’s interest in delay is one of administrative ne-
cessity. The city points out that it “conducts more than a thousand ve-
hicle impound hearings annually.”  Pet. for Cert. 8.  It holds about five 
percent of these hearings—those involving individuals who are unable 
to afford the impoundment fees—within 48 hours.  It “takes time to 
organize hearings: there are only so many courtrooms and presiding 
officials; the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his 
appearance; the city may have to find a substitute to cover that offi-
cer’s responsibilities while he attends the hearing.”  And the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding, which presumably would require the city to schedule 
annually 1,000 or more hearings, instead of 50 hearings, within a 48-
hour (or 5-day) time limit, will prove burdensome. The administrative 
resources available to modern police departments are not limitless.99 
The protections afforded private property owners by the Due 
Process Clause, far from absolute, are assessed in relation to the 
significant administrative tasks performed by local government 
and other public officials. 
Lesson #7:  Congress May Subject Municipalities to Suit in 
State Court Without Violating “State Sovereignty” 
In 1996, Susan Jinks, the widow of a man who died in a 
Richland County, South Carolina, detention center, brought 
claims in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
South Carolina Tort Claims Act.100  By the time the federal trial 
court dismissed both claims, the state’s two-year statute of limi-
tations had run, which was the basis of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court’s reversal of a state court jury verdict in Jinks’s fa-
vor.101  The United States Supreme Court, in Jinks v. Richland 
County, agreed to hear the case after the state high court “held 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which required the state statute of limi-
tation to be tolled for the period during which petitioner’s cause 
of action had previously been pending in federal court, is uncon-
stitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State’s politi-
cal subdivisions.”102 
First, Justice Scalia, in an opinion for a unanimous Court, 
dismissed the notion that Congress had exceeded its enumerated 
powers in enacting § 1367(d).103  The opinion then moved to the 
respondent county’s assertion “that § 1367(d) should not be in-
 
 99 Id. at 718 (quoting David v. City of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 1143, 1149 (2002) (Koz-
inski, J., dissenting), rev’d, 538 U.S. 751 (2003)). 
 100 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 460 (2003). 
 101 Id. at 460. 
 102 Id. at 458. 
 103 Id. at 457, 461. 
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terpreted to apply to claims brought against a State’s political 
subdivisions,” which the Court found “also to be without 
merit.”104  The body of Rehnquist Court commentators, which in 
other cases supported an expansive notion of sovereign immu-
nity,105 made an important distinction between the elevated 
status of a state and its more vulnerable municipalities: 
In respondent’s view, § 1367(d)’s extension of the time period in which 
a State’s political subdivisions may be sued constitutes an impermis-
sible abrogation of “sovereign immunity.” That is not so. Although we 
have held that Congress lacks authority under Article I to override a 
State’s immunity from suit in its own courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 . . . (1999), it may subject a municipality to suit in state court 
if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers, 
see id., at 756 . . . . Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period with re-
spect to state-law causes of action brought against municipalities, but 
we see no reason why that represents a greater intrusion on “state 
sovereignty” than the undisputed power of Congress to override state-
law immunity when subjecting a municipality to suit under a federal 
cause of action. In either case, a State’s authority to set the conditions 
upon which its political subdivisions are subject to suit in its own 
courts must yield to the enactments of Congress. This is not an en-
croachment on “state sovereignty,” but merely the consequence of 
those cases (which respondent does not ask us to overrule) which hold 
that municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally pro-
tected immunity from suit.106 
In other words, for immunity purposes, the hierarchy of nonfed-
eral governments remains basically intact. 
Lesson #8:  It Takes Egregious or Arbitrary Government 
Conduct for Property Owners to Prove Substantive Due 
Process Violations 
In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor, found that an Ohio city did not violate 
an affordable housing developer’s equal protection or due process 
rights when city officials submitted a referendum repealing the 
ordinance approving the developer’s site plan.107  Although the 
developer was successful in convincing the Ohio Supreme Court 
that the ordinance was not a proper subject of a referendum un-
der state law108 and in advancing its constitutional claims in the 
 
 104 Id. at 465. 
 105 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“[T]he powers delegated to 
Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to 
subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.”). 
 106 Jinks, 538 U.S. at 465–66. 
 107 538 U.S. 188, 190–91, 199 (2003). 
 108 Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 697 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio 
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federal Sixth Circuit,109 the Justices were much less sympathetic. 
The developer’s failure to offer proof of racially discrimina-
tory intent or purpose, in accordance with the requirements of 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.,110 proved fatal to the equal protection claim.111  On 
the due process claim, while the Sixth Circuit had held, “as a 
threshold matter, that respondents had a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to the building permits, and therefore a property inter-
est in those permits, in light of the city council’s approval of the 
site plan,”112 the Supreme Court felt no need to “decide whether 
respondents possessed a property interest in the building per-
mits, because the city engineer’s refusal to issue the permits 
while the petition was pending in no sense constituted egregious 
or arbitrary government conduct.”113  The Justices were equally 
unimpressed with the developer’s assertion “that the City’s sub-
mission of an administrative land-use determination to the char-
ter’s referendum procedures constituted per se arbitrary con-
duct.”114  In this way, the Court sent a strong signal to 
landowners that the protections afforded by Due Process Clause 
were reserved for those penalized by the most “egregious” and 
“arbitrary” instances of official misconduct. 
Lesson #9:  The Court Endorses Careful Planning for 
Environmentally Sensitive Lands 
One of the most important regulatory takings cases decided 
by the legal commentators comprising the Rehnquist Court in-
volved a comprehensive and controversial wet-growth regulatory 
scheme to protect the pristine waters of Lake Tahoe.  In Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,115 five colleagues joined Justice Stevens in declining to 
hold that “a moratorium on development imposed during the 
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a 
per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Tak-
ings Clause of the United States Constitution.”116  The delays 
faced by landowners seeking to develop their property were not 
 
1998). 
 109 Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 645 
 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 538 U.S. 188 (2003). 
 110 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
 111 Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 194. 
 112 Id. at 198. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. “The subjection of the site-plan ordinance to the City’s referendum process, re-
gardless of whether that ordinance reflected an administrative or legislative decision, did 
not constitute per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due process.”  Id. at 199. 
 115 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 116 Id. at 305–06, 342–43. 
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insignificant: 
This case actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent Ta-
hoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status quo 
while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and design-
ing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first, Ordinance 
81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983, 
whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21 was in effect 
from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two di-
rectives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the 
property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of 
32 months.117 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded “that the interest in ‘fairness 
and justice’ will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn 
Central [ad hoc balancing] approach when deciding cases like 
this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule.”118 
The Tahoe Sierra Court’s decision not to recognize another 
category of per se regulatory taking can be attributed in a signifi-
cant way to the majority’s recognition of and respect for careful 
planning, especially in environmentally sensitive regions.  This 
aspect of the decision is illustrated by the following excerpts from 
the majority opinion: 
  A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays associated with 
processing permits, or that covered only delays of more than a year, 
would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing practices, but 
it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning 
process. . . . [M]oratoria like Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 are 
used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo while 
formulating a more permanent development strategy. In fact, the con-
sensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria, or 
“interim development controls” as they are often called, are an essen-
tial tool of successful development. . . . 
  The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory 
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose 
such severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the financial con-
straints of compensating property owners during a moratorium may 
force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon the 
practice altogether. To the extent that communities are forced to 
abandon using moratoria, landowners will have incentives to develop 
their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be enacted, 
thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth. . . . 
  We would create a perverse system of incentives were we to hold 
that landowners must wait for a takings claim to ripen so that plan-
ners can make well-reasoned decisions while, at the same time, hold-
ing that those planners must compensate landowners for the delay. 
 
 117 Id. at 306. 
 118 Id. at 342. 
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  Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional process is even 
stronger when an agency is developing a regional plan than when it is 
considering a permit for a single parcel.119 
The message to regulators and landowners that emerges 
from this decision is that, in order to maintain the proper equi-
librium between private property rights and public needs, a bal-
ancing test that considers the specific circumstances in which the 
regulatory power is exercised is, except in limited circumstances, 
more appropriate than a per se approach. 
Lesson #10:  Regulators Must Ensure That Landowners 
Retain Something More Than Token Value 
In a second wet growth case, a five-Justice majority, in an 
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, refused to find that 
a landowner whose real property retained $200,000 in develop-
ment value even after the application of state wetlands restric-
tions was entitled to bring a per se regulatory takings challenge 
alleging a “total deprivation.”120  Although the majority in Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island remanded the case for a determination of 
whether the landowner could prevail under an alternative tak-
ings test,121 before it let go of the dispute, the Court explained 
that the fact that a property owner acquires a parcel after a regu-
lation goes into effect does not necessarily preclude a regulatory 
takings challenge.122  Justice Kennedy cautioned:  “[a] blanket 
rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right 
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord 
with the duty to compensate for what is taken.”123 
The Palazzolo decision contains another, potentially impor-
tant victory for landowners affected by environmental regula-
tions.  While, as noted above, the property in the case before the 
Court retained significant development value, there may be occa-
 
 119 Id. at 337–40 (footnotes omitted). 
 120 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610, 616, 632 (2001). 
 121 See id. at 632 (“The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, 
and for this purpose the case should be remanded.”); see also Peter B. Lord, Westerly Wet-
lands Dispute Finally Over, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Sept. 14, 2005, at B3: 
  Anthony Palazzolo’s wetlands dispute with the state of Rhode Island has 
grown in recent decades to become one of the state’s longest-running and most 
widely studied legal cases. This week, it quietly came to an end. . . . 
  During 23 years of administrative proceedings and 17 years of litigation, 
Palazzolo has tried to win permission to build his subdivision on the south 
shores of Winnapaug Pond, just north of Atlantic Avenue in Westerly. . . . 
  The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Rhode Island Superior Court 
for further consideration. After more testimony, Superior Court Judge Edwin 
Gale issued a 32-page ruling in July that went against Palazzolo once again. 
 122 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. 
 123 Id. at 628. 
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sions in which a landowner suffers a dramatic, though less-than-
total, deprivation.  In that event, the Court instructed, 
“[a]ssuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not 
evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner 
is left with a token interest.”124 
Lesson #11:  Judges Will Not Tolerate Backdoor Strategies 
Persistence and creativity did not pay off for Santa Fe High 
School officials in Texas, whose practice of electing a school chap-
lain to deliver Christian prayers over a public address system be-
fore varsity football games was declared to be in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.125  School offi-
cials then opted for an alternative system, which they worked out 
over the summer and fall of 1995: 
  The August policy, which was titled “Prayer at Football 
Games,” . . . authorized two student elections, the first to determine 
whether “invocations” should be delivered, and the second to select the 
spokesperson to deliver them. Like the July policy, it contained two 
parts, an initial statement that omitted any requirement that the con-
tent of the invocation be “nonsectarian and nonproselytising,” and a 
fallback provision that automatically added that limitation if the pre-
ferred policy should be enjoined. . . . 
  The final policy (October policy) is essentially the same as the Au-
gust policy, though it omits the word “prayer” from its title, and refers 
to “messages” and “statements” as well as “invocations.”  It is the va-
lidity of that policy that is before us.126 
Six Justices, in an opinion penned by Justice Stevens, were not 
convinced that the school had gone far enough.127  In Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, the Court concluded that 
“this policy does not provide the District with the constitutional 
safe harbor it sought.”128 
One of the messages sent by the Rehnquist Court commenta-
tors is that it is a difficult task for government officials to purge 
an invalid policy of its constitutional defects.  Going back to the 
drawing board with the intent to change the letter but not the 
spirit of a tainted policy is insufficient. Context and history are 
important: 
  This case comes to us as the latest step in developing litigation 
brought as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably 
violated the Establishment Clause. One of those practices was the 
 
 124 Id. at 631. 
 125 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 301 (2000). 
 126 Id. at 297–98. 
 127 Id. at 292, 301. 
 128 Id. at 317. 
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District’s long-established tradition of sanctioning student-led prayer 
at varsity football games. The narrow question before us is whether 
implementation of the October policy insulates the continuation of 
such prayers from constitutional scrutiny. It does not. Our inquiry 
into this question not only can, but must, include an examination of 
the circumstances surrounding its enactment.129 
Local governments should be advised that trying to sneak a de-
fective program or policy in through the back door is ultimately a 
formula for failure. 
Lesson #12:  The Equal Protection Clause Remains 
Potentially Effective as an Avenue of Relief Against 
Municipalities That Abuse Regulatory Power 
When Grace and Thaddeus Olech requested that the Village 
of Willowbrook, Illinois, which the Olechs and others had unsuc-
cessfully sued in an unrelated action, tie their property to the 
public water supply, local government officials responded with a 
condition that departed from the norm:130 
The Village at first conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting 
the Village a 33-foot easement.  The Olechs objected, claiming that the 
Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners 
seeking access to the water supply.  After a 3-month delay, the Village 
relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot ease-
ment.131 
The federal district court dismissed Grace Olech’s claim that the 
village had violated the Equal Protection Clause (her husband 
had died),132 but the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that “a 
plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that 
state action was motivated solely by a ‘spiteful effort to “get” him 
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’”133  
The Supreme Court, in its per curium opinion in Village of Wil-
lowbrook v. Olech answered in the affirmative the following ques-
tion:  “whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause 
of action on behalf of a ‘class of one’ where the plaintiff did not al-
lege membership in a class or group.”134 
 
 129 Id. at 315. 
 130 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000) (per curium). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 563–64.(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willow-
brook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), and quoting in turn 
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 134 Olech, 528 U.S. at 563–65. The Court noted that, in actuality, other neighbors who 
had joined the Olechs in their previous lawsuit had also been asked to dedicate a 33-foot 
easement. Id. at 564 n.*.  This led the Justices to observe, “Whether the complaint alleges 
a class of one or of five is of no consequence because we conclude that the number of indi-
viduals in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.”  Id. 
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While it remains difficult for landowners to bring successful 
Equal Protection claims, without the benefit of strict scrutiny af-
forded plaintiffs in cases involving a suspect class or fundamen-
tal rights,135 Olech is an important reminder that property own-
ers are still protected from government abuse: 
Olech’s complaint can fairly be construed as alleging that the Village 
intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connect-
ing her property to the municipal water supply where the Village re-
quired only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property 
owners.  The complaint also alleged that the Village’s demand was “ir-
rational and wholly arbitrary” and that the Village ultimately con-
nected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot ease-
ment.  These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective 
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional 
equal protection analysis.136 
Even if the regulatory takings movement is on the decline,137 lo-
cal land use regulators do not have a license to abuse or treat un-
fairly landowners and developers. 
Lesson #13:  Multiple Refusals of a Landowner’s 
Reasonable Development Requests Could Lead to a 
Substantial Jury Award 
Over a five-year period in the early 1980s, Del Monte Dunes 
and it predecessor in interest, landowners in the city of Mon-
terey, California, submitted nineteen site plans in an effort to 
create a residential development on its 37.6-acre oceanfront par-
cel.138  Although the planning commission’s professional staff rec-
ommended approval of the developer’s proposal in 1985 to devote 
nearly half of the site to public open space and only 5.1 acres to 
buildings and patios, the commission rejected the recommenda-
tion.139  The next year, the city council followed suit, offering the 
following reasons for its denial: 
[T]he council made general findings that the landowners had not pro-
vided adequate access for the development (even though the landown-
ers had twice changed the specific access plans to comply with the 
 
 135 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (“Unless a 
statute provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’ 
or discriminates against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection at-
tack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose.”). 
 136 Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted). 
 137 See, for example, the recent local government victories in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. 
City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005), and Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 138 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694, 698 
(1999). 
 139 Id. at 696–97. 
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city’s demands and maintained they could satisfy the city’s new objec-
tions if granted an extension), that the plan’s layout would damage 
the environment (even though the location of the development on the 
property was necessitated by the city’s demands for a public beach, 
view corridors, and a buffer zone next to the state park), and that the 
plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith’s Blue Butterfly (even 
though the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve 
or restore buckwheat habitat on almost half of the property, and even 
though only one larva had ever been found on the property).140 
Del Monte Dunes pursued equal protection, regulatory takings, 
and due process claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the city 
in federal district court.141  Eventually, a jury returned verdicts 
in the landowner’s favor on the first two grounds, and awarded 
$1.45 million in damages.142 
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the city brought its case to 
the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the following questions: 
(1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on 
Del Monte Dunes’ regulatory takings claim, (2) whether the Court of 
Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a standard that allowed 
the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city’s land-use decision, 
and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the 
rough-proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374 . . .  (1994), applied to this case.143 
While all members of the Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey Ltd. agreed that the Ninth Circuit’s discus-
sion of the Dolan test was “unnecessary” and “irrelevant to [the 
Supreme Court’s] disposition of the case,”144 there was a five-four 
split over the legitimacy of submitting the regulatory takings 
claim to a jury, with the majority holding in the affirmative.145 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that: 
to the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on unreason-
able governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the jury was 
that the city’s denial of the final development permit was inconsistent 
not only with the city’s general ordinances and policies but even with 
the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del 
Monte Dunes’ argument, in short, was not that the city had followed 
its zoning ordinances and policies but rather that it had not done so. 
As is often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed questions were 
whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting 
outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any result-
 
 140 Id. at 697–98. 
 141 Id. at 698. 
 142 Id. at 701. 
 143 Id. at 702. 
 144 See id. at 692, 702–03. 
 145 See id. at 692, 720–22. 
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ing damages. These were questions for the jury.146 
The result was a major financial disincentive to local govern-
ments that misuse their significant powers to approve some de-
velopment proposals subject to shifting conditions, and to reject 
other proposals on the basis of unsupportable or highly suspi-
cious rationales. 
Lesson #14:  Immunity for Local Legislators Is the Same as 
That of Their Federal and State Counterparts 
In Bogan v. Scott-Harris, Justice Clarence Thomas, writing 
for a unanimous body of legal commentators, reversed the First 
Circuit’s affirmance of a jury verdict against the mayor (Daniel 
Bogan) and the vice-president of the city council, Marilyn 
Roderick, of Fall River, Massachusetts. 147  The city officials were 
sued by Janet Scott- Harris, the former administrator of the 
city’s Department of Health and Human Services, whose position 
was eliminated after she brought termination charges against a 
politically connected employee, Dorothy Biltcliffe, who had made 
racial and ethnic slurs directed at her (Biltcliffe’s) colleagues.148  
In her suit, Scott-Harris “alleged that the elimination of her posi-
tion was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate 
against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing 
the complaint against Biltcliffe.”149  The plaintiff was successful 
in obtaining a favorable jury verdict on First Amendment 
grounds; the trial and appellate courts rejected the defendant of-
ficials’ claims that they were entitled to legislative immunity.150  
The Supreme Court disagreed: 
It is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are 
entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative 
activities.  In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials 
performing legislative functions, are entitled to the same protection.  
They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and sign-
ing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by respon-
dent constituted legislative activities.  We agree on both counts and 
therefore reverse the judgment below.151 
In fact, the Court observed that the officials’ acts “were, in form, 
quintessentially legislative,”152 and because “the ordinance, in 
substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.”153 
 
 146 Id. at 722. 
 147 523 U.S. 44, 46–48 (1998). 
 148 Id. at 46–47. 
 149 Id. at 47. 
 150 Id. at 47–48. 
 151 Id. at 46. 
 152 Id. at 55. 
 153 Id. 
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In this instance, the Court found convincing reasons for 
treating local lawmakers like their state and federal counter-
parts, who, according to precedent, are entitled to absolute legis-
lative immunity: 
  Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds support 
not only in history, but also in reason.  The rationales for according 
absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply 
with equal force to local legislators.  Regardless of the level of gov-
ernment, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited 
by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability.  
Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a law-
suit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time 
citizen-legislator remains commonplace.  And the threat of liability 
may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige 
and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil 
liability.154 
In the eyes of the Court, local legislators, who often find them-
selves threats of lawsuits by disgruntled landowners, are entitled 
to a significant privilege accorded those who are elected to serve 
in state capitals and Washington, D.C. 
V.  APPLYING THE COMMENTATORS’ LESSONS IN HYDRO CITY 
As we return to our hypothetical municipality—Hydro City—
it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court Commentators’ les-
sons in context.  Consider the following four scenarios involving 
the implementation of wet-growth tools. 
Scenario A 
Hydro City officials have decided to be more rigorous in their inspec-
tions during pre-construction and construction phases and to assess 
additional fines in the event of violations.  Some of the developers with 
poor compliance track records have filed suit against the city and the 
individual officials, claiming that they (developers) have a property 
right to fair enforcement of land regulations. 
City officials would be wise to consider the following four les-
sons in planning their defense for possible lawsuits by these de-
velopers:  First, the Court is skeptical about claims to property 
that are unsubstantiated by state law (Lesson #2).  A naked as-
sertion of a “property right to fair enforcement” should not be 
deemed sufficient to trigger judicial concern.  Second, the Com-
mentators have emphasized that comprehensive planning earns 
deference and trumps private rights-based arguments (Lesson 
#3).  If city officials are acting in accordance with standard pro-
 
 154 Id. at 52 (citations omitted). 
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cedures in support of published plans, they reduce the likelihood 
of judicial interference.  Third, it takes egregious or arbitrary 
government conduct for property owners to prove substantive 
due process violations (Lesson #8).  The enforcement of otherwise 
valid regulations against landowners is not the kind of govern-
ment activity that triggers heightened judicial scrutiny.  The pri-
vate party challenging the regulation carries a heavy burden in 
the face of significant judicial deference.  Fourth, immunity for 
local legislators is the same as that of their federal and state 
counterparts (Lesson #14).  While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 
strong incentives to sue local governments and their officials for 
constitutional torts, local lawmakers are protected from disgrun-
tled landowners who claim that their constitutional rights have 
been violated by the enactment of faulty ordinances or by other 
legislative acts. 
Scenario B 
SuperMegaMart has acquired land for a new discount retail facility on 
the city’s north side.  The city has responded by imposing a six-month 
moratorium on permits for big-box stores, ostensibly pending the draft-
ing and adoption of a new set of regulations for 100,000+ square-feet 
stores.  When the first moratorium was about to expire, a second six-
month moratorium followed.  While no real work has been performed 
on the ordinance, the city is considering a third moratorium. 
Four of the lessons from the Court Commentators indicate 
that Hydro City officials are on shaky ground.  First, the court 
looks at actual intent and does not accept sham purposes (Lesson 
#1).  As each month passes without the introduction of an actual 
ordinance, the chances grow that a reviewing court will see 
through this charade.  Second, the Justices will not tolerate back-
door strategies (Lesson #11).  Store counsel can effectively use 
the legislative history of the series of moratoria in a court chal-
lenge brought against the city.  Third, the Equal Protection 
Clause remains potentially effective as an avenue of relief 
against municipalities that abuse regulatory power (Lesson #12).  
It is possible that a court will find that local officials have crossed 
the line between careful deliberation and unreasonable, retribu-
tive behavior.  Fourth, multiple refusals of a landowner’s reason-
able development requests could lead to a substantial jury award 
(Lesson #13).  Members of a jury in a § 1983 case, introduced to a 
landowner complying with existing land-use regulations who has 
met with a non-responsive or even belligerent response, could in-
flict costly damage on the taxpayers of Hydro City. 
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Scenario C 
No new permanent buildings are permitted in buffer zones bordering 
the river, and owners of existing structures may not make additions or 
improvements.  Owners who can show a seventy-five percent reduction 
in value can apply for a variance.  Owners who can show a ninety per-
cent reduction will be given rights to develop non-sensitive properties 
elsewhere. 
There are three lessons from the Court that indicate the dif-
ficulties local governments face when implementing environ-
mental regulations that have a significant impact on land values 
and uses.  First, ripeness requirements continue to be significant 
hurdles for those bringing regulatory takings challenges (Lesson 
#4).  Landowners and developers bringing regulatory takings 
challenges often find themselves forced to make difficult and 
time-consuming strategic choices concerning the choice of forum 
and the need to request permission or a variance after being de-
nied relief initially (or even repeatedly).  Second, the Court en-
dorses careful planning for environmentally sensitive lands (Les-
son #9).  Courts have signaled their support for the development 
of comprehensive programs directed to reap defined and concrete 
environmental benefits for the entire community.  Third, regula-
tors must ensure that landowners retain something more than 
token value (Lesson #10).  There is a point at which the financial 
burdens carried by one or a group of landowners are deemed too 
onerous, and local regulators must be aware of the general and 
specific effects of their actions. 
Scenario D 
City officials, concerned about water consumption, pass an ordinance 
that imposes a sliding scale—tying costs to usage (the more usage, the 
higher the per-unit cost).  In order to secure enough votes to pass the 
ordinance, sponsors of the ordinance exempted existing users and other 
in-state companies from the new scheme.  Lawsuits are threatened. 
The Commentators have provided three lessons that address 
the fairness questions raised by these hypothetical facts.  First, 
the text trumps legislative history (Lesson #5).  If a piece of legis-
lation creates unfair or illegal categories, even the best of inten-
tions preceding its enactment will be deemed irrelevant.  Second, 
judges appreciate the administrative burdens faced by local offi-
cials (Lesson #6).  Though a separate branch, the judiciary is not 
unmindful of the significant challenges facing local legislatures 
today, when raising taxes is extremely difficult (and potentially 
fatal to a political career) and when financial support from Wash-
ington, D.C. is often insubstantial.  Third, Congress may subject 
municipalities to suit in state court without violating “state sov-
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ereignty” (Lesson #7).  Unlike the states who created them (and 
have the power to alter their powers and boundaries), munici-
palities are vulnerable to costly and otherwise injurious litiga-
tion.  This fact alone should lead to caution by local officials when 
they create distinctions that leave some landowners outside the 
benefited class. 
VI.  ON THE THRESHOLD OF CHANGE 
Only time will tell whether recent changes to the Court’s 
erstwhile stable membership (Roberts for Rehnquist and Alito for 
O’Connor) will mean a return to larger numbers of opinions, the 
formation of new alliances, or the creation of new, internal, insti-
tutional developments.  For now and the foreseeable future, local 
government officials engaged in or considering the implementa-
tion of innovative wet-growth controls can benefit from heeding 
the lessons of the body of legal commentators comprising the 
Rehnquist Court over its last eleven Terms. 
Considered together, the fourteen lessons caution a balanced 
approach to local, environmentally based regulations that have 
the potential not only to protect sensitive water bodies and lands 
and to benefit the human and nonhuman life that share our wa-
tersheds, but also to reduce the value and potential productive 
use of land by owners who are particularly burdened by even the 
wisest regulatory tools.  This balance is suggested in the Court’s 
skepticism about sham purposes and back-door methods on the 
one hand, and its generous deference to local officials on the 
other.  The balance is embodied in the Justices’ refusal to recog-
nize municipal sovereignty, while shielding local lawmakers with 
absolute immunity.  Most importantly, the balance is reflected in 
the Rehnquist Court commentators’ strong endorsement of com-
prehensive land-use and environmental planning, while opening 
the door to relief for landowners who are left with no more than 
token value or who are mistreated by arbitrary and non-
responsive public servants.  It is this author’s hope that, when we 
look back on the work product of the Roberts Court after it estab-
lishes its institutional persona, the same kind of beneficial bal-
ance will be readily apparent. 
